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Abstract 
 
Security is an elusive target in today’s high-speed and 
extremely complex, Web enabled, information rich 
business environment. This paper presents the idea that 
there are essential, basic organizational elements that 
need to be identified, defined and addressed before 
examining security aspects of a Web Engineering 
Development process. These elements are derived from 
empirical evidence based on a Web survey and 
supporting literature. This paper makes two contributions. 
The first contribution is the identification of the Web 
Engineering specific elements that need to be 
acknowledged and resolved prior to the assessment of a 
Web Engineering process from a security perspective. 
The second contribution is that these elements can be 
used to help guide Security Improvement Initiatives in 
Web Engineering. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Fundamental components of the web engineering 
development environment include multidisciplinary 
involvement[6]; a complex, agile, time sensitive 
development environment[16]; a diverse end-user 
population[21] and a usability focused design[21]. 
It could be argued in today’s Web engineering project 
environment that security should be included in this list. 
However, security is inherently not a part of ‘Vanilla - 
Off the Shelf’ Web engineering development processes 
and this inherent lack of security encourages 
environments that are susceptible to exploitation via 
potential breaches. These potential breaches translate into 
staggering corporate financial losses. The press is 
regularly inundated with a variety of security 
announcements validating these issues.  
These announcements range from industry surveys[5, 
12] reporting the trends and monetary losses, to 
application security breaches, to patch announcements. It 
is also important to recognize that potential security 
breaches are not limited to technical difficulties or 
process deficiencies. A recent ZDNET article published 
information on McAfee’s misfortune detailing the fact 
that a Deloitte external examiner left a back up CD in an 
airline seat pocket. The CD contained names, social 
security numbers, and stock information on  thousands of 
past and present McAfee employees[7, 20]. This 
information complements a Deloite 2005 statement 
indicating “it is clear that many security breaches are the 
result of human error or negligence resulting from weak 
operational practices”[5]. In order to improve human 
short comings, processes need to be developed and 
evolved so that they aid in the minimization of breaches 
due to human inadequacies.  
These events drive the need to integrate security into 
the development process so that it provides an acceptable 
amount of risk mitigation, at an acceptable price, at a 
realistic user acceptance level while protecting the 
organization’s information assets[8]. However, before 
you can effectively address the security needs of the 
business, there are essential elements that need to be 
acknowledged, addressed and resolved. These elements 
have been identified in a recent Web survey conducted 
over the summer of 2005[11]. 
 
2. Relevant Work 
 
Technical solutions abound in the security arena and 
they are proposed and disproved on a regular basis. 
Relevant security articles exist on an array of topics that 
focus on improving specific aspects of security. The 
articles in this area range from security requirements [29], 
to security risk [31], to the Common Criteria [25], to the 
establishment of Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development[9]. 
Viega’s article [29] on security requirements examines 
a critical area in establishing appropriate security. 
However, the article does not go into the aspects of these 
requirements and their cohesiveness with organizational 
compatibility. It also does not discuss foundation issues 
that need to be acknowledge and addressed before the 
security requirements are captured. 
Wang’s article inspects risk at various levels in the 
application along with the effects on quality factors [31]. 
However, the paper does not tackle organizational 
foundation issues that need to be addressed before 
security can be implemented successfully, effectively and 
continually. 
Literature is replete with articles that describe the 
implementation of a general Security Improvement 
Approach (SIA); however, they have the same issues. 
Articles by Taylor and McGraw [27], and McGraw[19] 
provide generic information that is not specific to Web 
Engineering and they fail to address underlying 
organizational issues that affect the ability of an 
organization to efficiently and effectively integrate 
security into the development process. 
The Common Criteria (CC) attempts to fuse an 
assortment of international standards into a set of 
evaluation criteria to be utilized against information 
technology products[25]. The CC’s biggest obstacle is the 
fact that one of the defining characteristics of a Web 
Engineering process is short development life cycles[18]. 
Short development life cycles do not coincide with the 
fact that the CC process is “Labor Intensive” consuming 
numerous weeks and months[25].  
Recent research produced the Security Criteria for 
Web Application Development (SCWAD)[9] which 
broadens the focus of the security examination 
specifically in the area of Web Engineering processes. 
SCWAD has been proposed to assess the security 
applicability of an existing Web engineering process and 
to provide guidance to Security Improvement Initiatives 
(SII)[9]. SCWAD specifically recognizes six essential 
security criteria for evaluating web engineering 
methodologies [9]. 
The Web survey discussed in this paper contributes the 
identification of five essential security elements that need 
to be acknowledged and addressed prior to a Security 
Improvement Initiative (SII) being conducted in an 
organization. Essential element identification is based on 
apparent organizational deficiencies identified in the 
survey and relevant supporting literature. These same 
elements can also be used to help guide current SIIs in 
Web Engineering. 
 
3. Survey Analysis 
 
The point of the survey was to attempt to determine 
how security is realistically perceived and implemented in 
industry during Web application development. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
The Web survey was validated by two different 
individuals in the financial industry. The first individual 
is a technical lead for a major financial institution in the 
United States and the second individual is a Security 
Specialist for a financial institution in the United 
Kingdom. 
The approach taken with the web survey was really 
more of a qualitative approach than a quantitative 
approach.  Due to the fact that the survey was basically 
capturing current / past information, Zelkowitz and 
Wallace categorized this approach as a historical 
“Lessons Learned” approach to software engineering 
experimentation[33]. This historical “Lessons Learned” 
approach is used to identify trends. The benefit to this 
approach is that it is a low cost solution to acquiring data. 
One of the drawbacks is that it “cannot be used for 
statistically validating the results”[33]. Another drawback 
is that it is difficult to replicate, with comparable results, 
due to variances in the participants and mitigating issues 
that affect interviewee opinions. There is also a lack of 
control, in Web surveys, over the validity of the 
respondents and their answers.   
Even thought the survey was carefully designed in the 
beginning with the majority of the questions having a 
specific answer[22], the sample size was relatively 
small,(fifty-three initial respondents) coupled with a high 
number of respondents who did not complete all of the 
sections (eighteen), which severely detracts from any 
statistical data that could be derived from the survey 
results.  
The majority of the respondents were acquired through 
e-mail request. The e-mail request was initiated through 
the British Computing Society in Glasgow. This request 
helped to target professionals in the industry. The 
balance, of the respondents, was acquired via 
communication with colleges, i.e., word of mouth.  The 
reduced sample size in the various areas helped support 
the initial qualitative approach to the implementation of 
the survey instrument. Hence, the point of the survey was 
not to argue the validity of the sample size, the coverage 
area, or the incomplete survey responses[13]. In 
academia, there has been a great deal of debate over the 
demographic groups that have access to the internet, why 
individuals do not complete surveys, and the best 
presentation design for web surveys.  
This survey endeavored to determine the responder’s 
opinion[24] and acquire practical information regarding 
his or her experience with security and development 
methodologies. The Web provided the vehicle with the 
broadest industrial coverage, with the least cost and risk 
to organizations while providing information on trends in 
the industry. Other approaches such as gathering log data 
will not indicate where security is in the development 
process and interviews are very time consuming and 
costly to all parties.  
 
3.2 Demographics 
 
The initial questions were used to determine the 
interviewee’s current role in the development process and 
to determine the overall size of the organization. The 
titles indicated that the interviewees were experienced IT 
professionals. Out of the initial fifty-three valid 
respondents who participated in the survey, forty-one of 
the respondents, to the web survey, were from the United 
Kingdom. The balance of the respondents consisted of 
seven from Jordan, one from France, one from Japan, and 
three from the United States. The options for the size of 
the respondent’s organization and their responses are 
detailed in Table 1. Fifty-three respondents participated in 
the survey; however, only thirty-five respondents 
provided input for all of the sections. 
Table 1. Organization size 
Categories Size Responses 
1 0 - 500 28 
2 500 - 1,000 4 
3 1,000 - 5,000 9 
4 5,000 - 10,000 3 
5 10,000 - 50,000 5 
6 50,000 - 100,000 2 
7 100,000 or More 2 
Although the specific industry was not captured in the 
survey, this result in the first category supports the idea 
that a lot of web development companies are small 
companies.  
 
4. Results 
 
As expected, the number of respondents decreased as the 
survey progressed from internet, to intranet to extranet 
questions. Out of the total number of respondents, fifty-
one indicated that they have an internet; thirty-two 
indicated that they have an intranet and twelve indicated 
that they have an extranet. 
It should be noted that most of the respondents 
represent small businesses. The majority of the 
respondent’s organizations have internet sites. The break 
down of the type of application development process 
implemented by the various organizations is shown in 
Table 2 – Application Development Process.  
The traditional systems development process appears 
to remain very prevalent in industry Web development. 
The responses that included some form of the traditional 
development process appeared in five out of the thirteen 
responses for internet development and eight out of the 
thirteen for intranet development and four out of six 
responses for extranet development. Oddly enough, none 
of the respondents indicated that they use both agile and 
traditional processes depending on the nature of the 
project. 
This implies that the organizations involved in the 
survey are either all or nothing when implementing a 
development process. This result supports previous 
application development research findings where specific 
organizations have taken a “one size fits all 
approach”[16]. One of the development process response 
options was “In-House”. In retrospect, it would have been 
interesting to have the individuals taking the survey 
explain their “In-House” approach at this point. This 
would have given some insight into the foundation of 
some of the customized development processes currently 
used in industry. 
Table 2.  Application development process 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Internet 2 3 2 0 6 13 
Intranet 1 6 2 0 4 13 
Extranet 0 2 2 0 2 6 
Table 2 - Key 
1 – Agile Development Process  
(Extreme Programming, DSDM)  
2 – Traditional Systems Development Processes  
(Water Fall Approach, Spiral Model)  
3 – A process that is a combination of Traditional 
and Agile Development Processes 
4 – Use both Agile and Traditional process depending  
on the nature of the project.  
5 – In-House 
6 – Total Number of Respondents 
An interesting point is that the data did not totally 
reflect expectations where the methodology and the size 
of the company were considered in the internet 
development process. The expectation was that the small 
companies would be using agile approaches and large 
companies would be using some form of a traditional 
approach. There is a category six company using an agile 
approach, two companies in category one using a 
traditional approach and one using an in-house approach. 
As the survey progressed to the intranet development 
questions, the number of companies using a traditional 
systems approach doubles to six companies. Two of these 
companies are in category one, three are in category five 
and one is in category seven. There were no agile answers 
to the extranet development question. As expected, there 
were no companies in category one that responded to 
having an extranet. 
It is encouraging that seventeen of the respondents 
indicated that they have a defined application internet 
development process; however, nineteen out of thirty-six 
respondents indicated that they did not. At this point in 
the survey, the idea was to determine the existence of a 
defined process within an organization and not the 
specifics of the process. One issue that did surface 
through analysis is the question of a defined vs. implicit 
development process. An alternative set of questions 
would have been to ask if participants had an implicit 
development process and to have expanded on exactly 
what that entailed.    
It is worth noting that there were more positive 
answers to the question asking about the existence of a 
defined application development process for intranet and 
extranet applications. The same question, posed about the 
internet, yielded more negative responses. It should be 
noted that out of the six respondents who have a defined 
extranet application development process, five of the 
respondents have all three forms of Web application 
development processes defined. Hence, the trend 
indicates that organizations with a defined extranet 
process are more likely to have defined processes for 
internets and intranets. The high-level application 
development process results are summarized in Table 3 – 
Defined Application Development Process.  
Table 3. Defined application development process 
Question YES NO DNK* Respondents 
Internet  14 19 3 36 
Intranet  13 11 3 27 
Extranet  6 4 1 11 
*DNK: Do Not Know 
There were thirty-five responses to a question about 
the organization having a defined application 
development internet security process. Out of the thirty-
five responses, seventeen indicated that they have an 
internet application development security process, while 
fourteen indicated that they did not and four indicated that 
they “Do Not Know”. 
The expectation was that there would have been more 
responses that had a defined internet application 
development process than a defined internet security 
process. On that same line of thought, another expectation 
also would have been for the respondents who answered 
positively to the defined application development process 
question to be the same as the respondents in the defined 
application development security process question.  
In other words, the organizations that have an 
application development process would have been 
expected to have a security development process. A 
detailed examination reveals that there were seven 
responders who confirmed having a defined security 
development process but who also did not indicate 
positively that they have a defined application 
development process. This result, however, was neither 
logical nor expected from the survey. 
The organizational demographics for the seven 
respondents who have a security process and do not have 
a defined development process indicates that these 
respondents are from relatively small organizations.  The 
data are summarized in table 4 – Security Process & No 
Defined Application Development Process.  
Table 4. Security process & no defined application 
development process 
0-500 5 
1,000 – 5,000 1 
5,000 – 10,000 1 
The results of the organizational demographics of the 
ten respondents that had both a defined application 
development process and an internet security process 
were as expected.  The results were spread out across the 
respondent categories. This information is summarized in 
table 5 – Security Process & A Defined Application 
Development Process. 
Table 5. Security process & a defined application 
development process 
0-500 3 
500 – 1,000 2 
1,000 – 5,000 2 
5,000 – 10,000 0 
10,000 – 50,000 1 
50,000 – 100,000 2 
100,000 or More 0 
The survey did indicate that security is being 
substantially recognized “During the initial design phase” 
for internet, intranet, and extranet development.  This is 
an excellent indicator that security is starting to be 
included at the beginning of the development process.  To 
what depth security is being addressed in the design phase 
is still open to investigation. 
The survey then attempted to determine the phases that 
were included in the security process, whether there is an 
individual responsible for ensuring that the security 
process is followed and if there is any job related impact 
for not following the security process. The specifics that 
the survey revealed, in reference to the organizations that 
claimed to have defined application development security 
processes, are summarized in Table 6 – Security Process 
Information.  
The table reveals that the weakest phase is the 
feedback phase. Most of the organizations that responded 
indicated there was an individual on the team who is 
responsible for insuring that the intranet security process 
is followed, but there was a drop in positive responses to 
the question inquiring about a job related impact for not 
following the intranet security process. 
It is also worth noting that twenty-three of the 
respondents felt that their organizations considered 
security to be “Very Important” in its internet, intranet, 
and extranet applications. However, the number of “Very 
Important” responses fell to sixteen when asked how 
important security is within the development process.  
Organizations appear to be contributing to the security 
education of their employees. Thirty seven respondents 
indicated that they take any actions to educate employees 
about computer security. The survey did not attempt to 
define this information to determine the type of security 
education that was being distributed in organizations. The 
education numbers compared with the perception of 
importance indicates that there still appears to be a gap 
between understanding security and actually doing 
something about security in the development process. 
This observation is also supported by the fact that out of a 
potential thirty-five respondents that completed the 
survey only seventeen have an internet security process. 
Table 6. Security process information 
Phases Internet Intranet Extranet 
Total 
Respondents 17 13 5 
Risk Analysis 12 6 3 
Security 
Requirements 14 9 5 
Security Design  13 9 5 
Controlled 
Implementation  14 7 5 
Testing  12 5 4 
Feedback 9 6 5 
Employees Follow 
Security Process  14 9 5 
Individual 
Responsible for 
Insuring Security 
Process is 
followed 
15 9 5 
Job Impact for not 
following the 
Security Process 
4 5 3 
Only nineteen (one more than half of the respondents) 
gave a positive answer to the question of the organization 
having a disaster recovery plan that includes the 
applications in the security design requirements. Only 
half of the nineteen responses indicated that the 
organization had tested the disaster recovery plan through 
execution. 
 
5. Web Engineering Security Missing 
Element 
 
Viega stated the issues well in the statement “The 
problem is, building secure software is not easy” [30]. 
The survey attempts to gain an understanding of the 
current role security plays in the Web application 
development process in industry. Since the survey 
specifically targeted Web application development the 
information derived from the results is targeted in the 
same area. That is not to say that the information may or 
may not be relevant in other areas of application 
development, but that the research conducted specifically 
inquired about Web application development processes.  
In doing so, the survey identifies several elements that 
organizations appear to be failing to address. These 
identified elements need to be stressed when considering 
a Security Improvement Initiative (SII) for Web 
development projects. The detailed analysis of the 
information presented in this paper is reported in the Web 
Survey Technical Report [11]. The five essential elements 
identified in this survey are as follows: 
1. Web Application Development Methodology 
2. Web Security Development Process Definition 
3. End Users Feedback   
4. Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
5. Job Related Impact 
 
5.1 Web Application Development Methodology 
 
Before security can be addressed in an organization’s 
Web application development process, there needs to be 
an application development methodology in use within 
the organization. This methodology can be either implicit 
or explicit, though it is recommended that the 
development process be explicit. An explicit development 
methodology helps encourage understanding among 
existing employees and can be used to help foster new 
employee training. The point supported by the survey is 
that there needs to be a Web application development 
methodology within the organization, regardless of 
approach. A web development methodology also helps to 
provide structure to the complex, agile, time sensitive 
development environment. The survey responses 
indicated that there is the possibility that environments 
exist that claim to have a security process and no 
application development process.   
This result initiates several queries. The natural 
questions include: was the survey too strict in asking for a 
defined documented process; are there organizations that 
do not have implicit or explicit development 
environment; and are there potential discrepancies on the 
definition of security among the participating parties? 
These concerns are valid observations to note and warrant 
a discussion in their own right. Regardless of the outcome 
of those discussions, security can not be implemented into 
a development environment that does not exist. Hence, 
the identification of the Web application development 
process (even if it is implicit) is a critical starting point 
when trying to integrate security into a development 
environment. 
 
5.2 Web Security Development Process Definition 
 
The discrepancy in the responses around the questions 
concerning a defined application development process 
and a defined application development internet security 
process indicates that there is possibly some confusion 
over the definition of an internet security process in the 
industry. In general, most of the respondents indicated 
that the phases of the security development process were 
present. This indication naturally leads one to suspect that 
the respondents could have simply added a security 
checklist to a small piece of a traditional process and 
called it a security development process. 
This discrepancy naturally leads to a discussion about 
terminology. Terminology in various environments has 
the potential to have multiple meanings. As Anderson 
indicated, reality is a complex environment in the real 
world[1]. Different organizations will require “some 
combination of user authentication, transaction integrity 
and accountability, fault-tolerance, message secrecy and 
covertness”[1]. 
In order to cut down on possible confusion and to 
ensure that everyone is communicating properly, 
organizations should define: 
? What security means to the business 
? What it means to a web application 
? What it means in the development process 
? What a Web Engineering Security development 
process entails. 
Defining this information naturally supports the Web 
engineering criteria for a usability focused design. For the 
purposes of this discussion, security should be defined in 
terms of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability also 
know as the CIA[23]. Security, in terms of a web 
application, means that the information resources are 
suitably protected in terms of the CIA and that the level 
of protection is based on acceptable risk and appropriate 
end-user requirements. Security in the development 
process means integrating appropriate security measures 
into the existing development process in order to produce 
a more secure end-product. A Web Engineering Security 
process should include security information that is present 
in the Web Engineering Security (WES) 
Methodology[10]. Clearly defining the Web security 
development process will encourage clearer 
communication among employees and help with future 
employee training. 
 
5.3 End-User Feedback 
 
The survey noted that there was a lack of end-user 
feedback in the internet, intranet and extranet 
development processes. If a development process does 
not attempt to acquire feedback from the end users, this 
could signal potentially large problems with the 
development process alignment with the needs of the 
business. Strong support for end-user participation, in 
Web application development, has been previously 
indicated in a journal article by McDonald and 
Welland[17]. 
This lack of feedback has a direct impact on the 
potential effectiveness of a security solution. Actual end-
users, not surrogate end-users, need to be used in the 
testing of the application. End-users will perform 
operations, submit data, and interpret instructions in ways 
that the development team, the business team or the 
technical staff within an organization could never dream! 
This is also true from a security perspective. 
End-users should be observed and consulted for 
information on the effectiveness of the implemented 
security solution. Observing employees has the potential 
to reveal security issues and application problems that 
could be manipulated into contributing to a security 
breach.  
It could be argued that employees are not always forth 
coming with information, especially if the lack of security 
or the potential security vulnerability either does not 
directly affect their duties or actually helps them to 
accomplish their assigned task. This indicates that “users 
often disable or ignore security to get their work 
done”[3]. The opposite could also be argued in that 
employees may not be aware that they are creating 
security problems through a lack of knowledge, general 
education and training. Hence, a multiple stream 
approach consisting of end-user involvement in testing, 
end-user observation, and end-user consultation is 
recommended when working with end-users. 
The concept of involving end-users in the security 
aspect of the application development process is not a 
new concept. Saltzer and Schroeder categorized 
“Psychological Acceptability” as one of eight “useful 
principles that can guide the design and contribute to an 
implementation without security flaws”[26].  
Saltzer’s and Schroeder’s viewpoint was from the 
perspective of minimizing mistakes through the human 
interface design which is a valid point, but it does not 
specifically address end-user involvement in testing or 
observation of the end-user during testing. Existing 
research[3, 26] coupled with the results of the survey 
discussed in this paper strengthens the case for an 
organization to seek end-user feedback from a security 
perspective.  
 
5.4 Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
 
Nineteen of the thirty-seven respondents indicated that 
they have a disaster recovery plan that includes the 
individual applications. When asked if the organization 
has tested the disaster recovery plan by execution within 
the past twelve months the number fell to ten. Testing the 
disaster recovery plan implies that the plan is relatively 
up-to-date and is functional as of the last execution. 
Hence, the survey is really saying that there were ten out 
of a potential thirty-seven organizations that have an up-
to-date, tested and functional disaster recovery plan.  
This information concurs with an AT&T “survey of 
more than 1,200 businesses conducted from January to 
August, 2005; (where) nearly 40 percent stated that 
business continuity planning was not a priority”[2].   
Security is really a risk management game in today’s 
society [30]. In today’s Web enabled environment 
disruptions are measured in minutes, not hours[14]. When 
it comes to risk, organizations have to make hard 
decisions on exactly how much risk it is willing to accept 
and exactly how much money it is willing to spend to 
achieve the agreed upon level of security [8]. 
The logical progression, once the risk and cost 
decisions have been made, is to address the need for a 
disaster recovery plan. There are a multitude of reasons 
for developing and implementing a disaster recovery 
plan. These reasons not only include the obvious 
technical attacks on an organization’s Web site, as 
reported by The Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) [28], but also natural disasters and terrorist 
attacks. These possibilities have been blatantly exhibited 
over the past year or so and include: The Asian Tsunami; 
Hurricane Katrina; Madrid Bombings[4]; Terrorist 
bombing in London; and The Hemel Hempstead Oil 
Depot Fire[15].  
These events stress the need for organizations to have 
and test a disaster recovery plan. If the organization does 
not have a disaster recovery plan, then it is difficult to 
develop a cost effective secure design solution for a Web 
application.  
 
5.5 Job Related Impact 
 
The survey revealed that the majority of the 
organizations do not have a job related impact for not 
following the security development process. There needs 
to be a job related impact associated with security process 
compliancy. Employees need to understand that there is a 
job related impact for not following organizational 
processes. This becomes even more important when 
considering security. 
One solution would be to provide positive and 
negative reinforcement. The idea is to reward individuals 
that adhere to the security process. An example would be 
to provide monetary rewards to programmers based on 
the amount of secure code they produce, not the total 
amount of code that they generate. On the other side of 
this issue, there needs to be repercussions for individuals 
who do not follow the organization’s security 
development process. Another idea that has surfaced is to 
tie security to the employees yearly evaluation [32]. 
Web application development takes place in a fast 
paced environment where business reputations, market 
shares, financial opportunities and losses are at risk daily. 
This increased performance pressure supports the 
business need for increased job related impact measures 
in secure Web application development. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The issues covered in this paper have been lightly 
discussed, in some form or variation, as solitary issues of 
importance during application development; however, 
they have never been viewed as a group of criteria for 
secure Web application development. Realistically, the 
outcome of this survey presents the foundations for 
additional research on common sense solutions in the area 
of Web Engineering security processes.  
The results from the Web survey have identified five 
elements that should be examined prior to any Security 
Improvement Initiative (SII) being conducted. The basic 
principle is that there appears to be fundamental issues 
with industrial Web application development that need to 
be addressed. The survey indicates that the elements 
listed in section five appear to be problem areas and 
warrant additional research. This does not mean that the 
list is exhaustive or conclusive or that these elements are 
mandatory for an organization to function. However, their 
presence will potentially improve the results of the SII 
and/or provide a less resistant path to SII identified areas 
that need improvement. This information can also be used 
to identify problem areas in SII’s that are currently under 
construction.  
An interesting topic to examine after conducting any 
survey is lessons learned. More specifically, if you could 
repeat the survey, would you repeat the survey in the 
same manner? The answer is “No”. The survey should be 
divided into three separate surveys, one survey each for 
the internet, intranet and extranet. The restructure is based 
on the fact that several participants dropped out of the 
survey and that participants who did not pay close 
attention to the questions thought they were answering 
the same questions repeatedly. When, in reality, they 
were answering the same types of questions for the 
various forms of the net.  
Future work in this area should include an attempt to 
drill down into the various interpretations of the 
definition of security among an assortment of 
organizations. It should also attempt to acquire more 
detailed information on an organization’s in-house 
development process approaches to security and examine 
implicit approaches to security and their effectiveness in 
‘real-world’ environments. Additional areas of interest 
that the survey did not explore would include: any 
interdependencies between the essential elements and the 
actual and/or perceived Return on Investment (ROI) for 
the individual stages of the development life cycle and 
specific ROI for security within each stage of the life 
cycle. 
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